

# Slovenian Competition Day Ljubljana, 26 September 2019

# **Effective Competition Law Remedies**

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Competition



### Remedies in antitrust infringement decisions

- Ensure the effectiveness of antitrust remedies: legal and practical requirements/implications
  - □ Powers, objectives and (guiding/limiting) principles
  - □ Types of remedies: pros&cons
  - □ Process



#### Antitrust remedies: powers and principles

- The Commission can impose <u>any</u> remedy, whether behavioural or structural, which is necessary to bring the infringement <u>effectively</u> to an end, having regard to the principle of <u>proportionality</u> (recital 12 and art. 7 of Reg. 1/2003)
  - □ The notion of effectiveness
  - □ The principle of proportionality



# The notion of effectiveness: what is/are the objective(s) of the remedy?

- Re-establish the situation as it was before the infringement (Status quo ante)
- Re-establish the situation as it would be today absent the infringement (counterfactual)
- Re-establish the competitive process, i.e. recreating the conditions for a competitive and contestable market to the benefit of both existing competitors and new entrants. But:
  - > No guarantee of a specific market outcome
  - No compensation for individual competitors (damage actions)
- Prevent repetition of the infringement and eliminate its consequences (Akzo, C-62/86, §155)



# The principle of proportionality

- The remedy must be "proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end" (article 7 of Reg. 1/2003):
  - On the one hand, the remedy must go <u>as far as necessary</u> to bring the infringement effectively to an end;
  - On the other hand, the remedy must be <u>limited to what is necessary</u> to achieve its objective, i.e. when there are several appropriate measures, the least onerous one must be imposed
    - Stricter version of the test (Automec, T-24/90, §51): "it is not for the Commission to impose its own choice from all the various potential courses of action which are in conformity with the Treaty"



### Antitrust remedies: options (1)

Cease and desist orders

□ Pros: proportionality + flexibility / dynamic implementation

Cons: risks for timeliness / effectiveness / complex assessment/monitoring



# Antitrust remedies: options (2)

- Specific measures (behavioural / structural)
  - Need to strike balance between proportionality (Automec) and effectiveness; otherwise the power to impose "any measure" would be meaningless...
  - Or at least: outline possible options and/or prescriptive (positive and negative) guiding principles



# Antitrust remedies: options (3)

- Neutralise the effects of the infringement
  - Ufex (C-119/97 P, §94): "If anti-competitive effects continue after the practices which caused them have ceased, the Commission [...] remains competent [...] to act with a view to eliminating or neutralising them"
  - Akzo (C-62/86, §155): remedy "intended to [...] eliminate its consequences"
  - Commercial Solvents (C-6-7/73, §§45-46): "order to do certain acts or provide certain advantages which have been wrongfully withheld"; "ensure that the infringement was made good and that Zoja was protected from the consequences of it"



#### **Effective antitrust remedies: process**

- The identification of the appropriate remedy in the final decision is a complex case-specific analysis
- Early discussion on remedies helps to identify the appropriate remedies, to carry out the proportionality test, and later to assess and monitor compliance

□ It might also trigger commitments or cooperation

Complexity in identifying the remedy should not deter enforcement



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# **THANK YOU!**

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